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Expanding Victims’ Rights in the 




The role and importance of victims of crime to the criminal justice 
system was aptly described by the Honourable Mr. Justice Martin in his 
Report to the Attorney General as follows:  
The victim of crime is uniquely placed among members of the public to 
assess how effectively the administration of criminal justice responds 
to the fact of a crime having been committed. No one, with the possible 
exception of the offender, is closer to the criminal act, and thus, 
generally speaking, more interested in the response of the criminal 
justice system to that act. Therefore, satisfying the interests and needs of 
victims, is, along with treating the accused fairly, one of the criminal 
justice system’s most important objectives.1 
Ironically, while there can be little doubt that the victim is the person 
most directly affected by the commission of a criminal offence, traditionally 
our adversarial system failed to accommodate the interests of anyone 
other than the state and the accused.2 This flowed from the concept that 
crimes were committed against the state and prosecutions were undertaken 
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1 
Report of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee, Charge Screening, Disclosure, 
and Resolution Discussions (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1993), at 307. 
2
 This is in contrast to the historical role of victims during the Anglo-Saxon period when 
crimes were akin to torts and victims were responsible for pursuing persons who had harmed them 
in order to receive compensation. For further reading on this topic see: John Hagan, Victims Before 
the Law: The Organizational Domination of Criminal Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983); Peter 
Burns, “Private Prosecutions in Canada: The Law and a Proposal for Change” (1975) 21 McGill 
L.J. 269.  
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in the name of Her Majesty the Queen. The result was that the criminal 
trial was viewed as “a contest between the state and the accused”,3 thereby 
barring the consideration of the rights or interests of any third party. 
Hence, while the criminal justice system expected much from victims 
of crime in terms of reporting offences and cooperating as required in the 
investigation and any subsequent prosecution, it provided little in return. 
Rather, once a crime was reported, victims were largely ignored and 
relegated to the role of silent bystanders despite the fact that their 
privacy, security and safety interests could be at risk. Moreover, in some 
circumstances, the criminal process itself exacerbated the loss of autonomy 
and trauma experienced by victims.  
In the late 20th century, the plight of victims and the need to 
safeguard their interests hit the political radar. By the time the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms4 was proclaimed in force on April 17, 
1982, the victims’ rights movement had gained momentum throughout 
North America. Compensation schemes were established for victims of 
crime, other support services were developed to assist victims through 
the criminal process, and efforts were made to reduce the risk of secondary 
victimization arising from some of the discriminatory evidentiary and 
procedural rules of the criminal process. The Charter  assisted this 
movement by offering the means by which persons other than the accused 
and the Crown could assert rights in criminal proceedings. The Charter 
also provided the basis upon which the Supreme Court would ultimately 
find that the rights of complainants and witnesses are entitled to equal 
protection.  
Not long after the Charter’s enactment, its influence on legislative 
initiatives was readily apparent. Parliament embraced Charter principles 
in enacting legislation designed to advance the procedural, substantive 
and welfare rights of victims. Indeed, since the early 1990s the Charter 
has been expressly referenced in several amendments to the Criminal 
Code5 that are aimed at facilitating the testimony of children and sexual 
assault complainants as well as the protection of privacy interests in third 
party records. As a result of this legislative reform, victims have gained 
greater recognition as well as a greater role in the criminal process. For 
instance, prior to the proclamation of the Charter in April of 1982, any 
                                                                                                            
3
 R. v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, 66 C.C.C. (3d) 321, at 403 (S.C.C.). 
4
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 
[hereinafter “the Charter”]. 
5
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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form of victim participation in criminal proceedings was non-existent. 
Now, victims have statutory rights of participation at various stages of 
the criminal process. In addition, the evidentiary and procedural rules 
governing criminal proceedings have undergone significant reform in an 
attempt to reduce the risk of secondary victimization. Also, as a result of 
legislative reform by provincial and territorial governments, victims’ 
rights legislation has been enacted in all Canadian jurisdictions. Most 
jurisdictions also offer some form of compensation for victims of crime. 
Consequently, victims of crime now enjoy more procedural, substantive 
and welfare rights. In short, the evolution of the role of victims during 
the 1980s and 1990s transformed the legal landscape.  
This paper focuses on the gains that victims have made over the last 
25 years predominately through legislative reform and the related Charter 
jurisprudence. It then questions whether these gains have resulted in 
increased victim satisfaction or whether the Charter, and the numerous 
legislative initiatives designed to address victims’ interests, including 
the enactment of victims’ bills of rights, merely created false hopes.  
Finally, it considers some of the remaining challenges and whether there 
are other viable measures to address the lingering dissatisfaction of victims 
with the criminal justice system.  
II. LEGISLATIVE REFORM DURING THE CHARTER ERA  
The concept of some degree of victim participation in criminal 
proceedings and the need for greater evidentiary and procedural protections 
to guard against the risk of secondary victimization took hold in the late 
1980s and continued with vigour well into the 1990s. This evolution in 
the role of the victim and the need to safeguard victims’ interests is 
evident in the introduction of victims’ rights legislation, the numerous 
amendments to the Criminal Code6 and other legislative initiatives during 
this period which are discussed herein.  
1. Victims’ Bills of “Rights”: A Misnomer  
Starting in 1986 with the enactment of Manitoba’s Victims’ Bill of 
Rights,7 every province and territory throughout Canada has enacted some 
form of victims’ rights legislation. While the bills vary to some extent, 
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 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
7
 S.M. 1998, c. 44. 
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at a minimum they all provide that, upon request, victims are entitled to 
receive information about the status of the investigation and the progress 
of the proceedings. This formal recognition that victims are entitled to 
certain basic information about the proceedings is significant. Indeed,  
it is a critical first step in allowing for greater victim involvement in and 
understanding of the criminal process.  
Prior to the enactment of victims’ rights legislation, criticism was often 
voiced that victims were being forgotten and ignored by the criminal 
justice system. Following the laying of a charge, the victim heard nothing 
more of the case unless and until required as a witness. In cases of a plea 
or where the victim was not required as a witness, the victim sometimes 
heard nothing more of the matter and was left guessing as to the ultimate 
disposition of the case. Even in cases of notoriety, victims would learn 
of developments in the case such as an offender’s release on bail, plea 
agreements and sentencing dispositions through the media, through 
members of their community, or through first-hand observations if they 
subsequently encountered the offender.8 Consequently, the enactment of 
victims’ rights legislation was an essential development in the evolution 
of the victim’s role in the criminal process. By recognizing that victims 
are entitled to basic information about the criminal process, legislatures 
have provided the necessary foundation for victims to become aware of 
their role, of the support services that may be available, and of any rights 
of participation that may exist.  
The Charter’s influence on the enactment of victim rights legislation 
is evident. For instance, prior to the enactment of the Ontario Victims’ 
Bill of Rights, 1995,9 there were calls for a victim-centred and Charter-
driven review of the criminal process in Ontario to ensure that victims 
were afforded “equal protection and benefit” of the law and “security of 
                                                                                                            
8
 In 1993, Priscilla de Villiers, whose daughter was murdered by Jonathan Yeo, an offender 
out on bail for serious offences, described her role as a victim to the Standing Committee on 
Administration of Justice as follows:  
As victims, however, once the Halton police had concluded their part of the investigation, 
we had no contact with any government official, in spite of the extensive media coverage. 
In fact, the few pronouncements made by the Attorney General’s office were published in 
the Toronto Sun and brought to our attention by a reporter with that newspaper. . . . As victims, 
we had no persona, we had no face. Nina’s death was sensational at the time, and yet we 
received little consideration as victims. What consideration, then, can the equally tragic, less 
publicized cases expect? 
(Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Committee Hearings, May 31, 1993, at 1540.) 
9
 S.O. 1995, c. 6. 
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the person” as guaranteed by the Charter.10 Also, in 1992, the coroner’s 
jury at the Jonathan Yeo inquest went so far as to recommend a “Charter of 
Rights for victims” in order to “stop victims from being re-victimized”.11 
Following on the heels of the Yeo jury recommendations, CAVEAT,12 a 
victims’ rights non-profit organization founded by Priscilla de Villiers, 
the mother of one of Yeo’s murder victims, lobbied for the enactment  
of a victims’ bill of rights to help protect the victim and inject more 
accountability into the justice system.  
Further, the Canadian Statement of Basic Principles of Justice for 
Victims of Crime, which serves as a guide to the federal and all provincial 
and territorial governments in the development of policies, programs and 
legislation related to victims of crime, expressly recognizes that “all persons 
have the full protection of rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms . . .” and that the “rights of victims and offenders 
need to be balanced”.  
Accordingly, the Charter has assisted in shaping provincial and 
territorial legislation designed to assist victims and witnesses in the criminal 
process. The enactment of victims’ bills of rights has provided a recognized 
standard of treatment for victims of crime which includes the right to 
receive information about the process. The provision of information is 
an essential first step towards ensuring that the system is more accountable 
and that victims have the opportunity to become more involved if they 
so choose.  
While the enactment of victims’ rights legislation is significant as 
it recognizes the need to keep victims apprised of developments in the 
proceedings, it unrealistically heightened the expectations of some victims. 
This is likely due to the fact that the very title of most bills, “Victims’ 
Bill of Rights”, is misleading in that it suggests something that does not 
exist: rights. Indeed, any hope that victims’ bills of rights provided 
enforceable statutory rights vanished soon after their enactment. Within 
three years of the enactment of Ontario’s Victims’ Bill of Rights, 1995,13 
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 The Advisory Board on Victims’ Issues, “Victims of Crime in Ontario: A Vision For 
The 1990’s” (Ontario, Queen’s Printer, 1991), at 21-22. 
11
 Ministry of the Solicitor General, Inquest into the Death of Jonathan Yeo, Verdict of the 
Jury, Recommendation 129 (1992).  
12
 Canadians Against Violence Everywhere Advocating Its Termination. Ten years after its 
formation, CAVEAT ceased operations on May 31, 2001. In a May 10, 2001 news release announcing its 
closure, the gains made by CAVEAT since its opening in 1991 were summed up as follows: “[T]he 
role of the victim in the criminal justice system is now accepted as an integral part of the system 
itself and the inclusion of victims in policy making signals that our work has not been in vain.” 
13
 S.O. 1995, c. 6. 
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the decision of Vanscoy v. Ontario14 found that the Victims’ Bill of Rights 
conferred no rights at all and was nothing more than “a statement of 
governmental policy wrapped in the language of legislation”.15  
In Vanscoy,16 the victims in two separate cases relied upon the Victims’ 
Bill of Rights, 199517 to request declaratory relief after the Crown proceeded 
with pleas over their objection. One applicant, Ms. Vanscoy, was the 
mother of a 14-year-old girl who was shot to death by a young person. 
Ms. Vanscoy challenged the Crown’s decision to accept a plea to 
manslaughter and proceed with a joint submission for a two-year custodial 
disposition over her objection. The second applicant, Ms. Even, objected 
to the Crown accepting a plea to aggravated assault from the original 
charge of attempt murder. In dismissing the applications, the Court 
unequivocally rejected the assertion that the pleas violated any of the 
victims’ “rights” under the Ontario Victims’ Bill of Rights or that the 
failure to be kept informed violated their section 7 Charter rights. 
Rather, the Court held that the Victims’ Bill of Rights, 1995 was merely  
“a statement of principle and social policy, beguilingly clothed in the  
language of legislation”18 and therefore did not confer any “rights”.  
As a result of the Vanscoy19 decision, victims’ rights legislation has 
been criticized as lacking teeth and giving rise to false expectations.20 In 
addition to the lack of any enforceable “rights”, the bills suffer from 
other weaknesses. For instance, the standards of treatment set out in 
victims’ bills of rights are often reliant upon victim initiative, silent as to 
the particular person or group responsible for providing the “right”, and 
are couched heavily in language that conveys broad discretion to justice 
system participants as to how and when information and other services 
are to be provided. Indeed, while all bills recognize that victims are 
entitled, upon request, to information about the status of the investigation 
and the proceedings, they do not state who is responsible for providing 
this information — whether it is the Crown, the police, the victim/witness 
assistance program or some other justice system participant. In addition, 
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 [1999] O.J. No. 1661, 99 O.T.C. 70 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
15 Vanscoy v. Ontario, [1999] O.J. No. 1661, 99 O.T.C. 70, at para. 41 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
16
 Vanscoy v. Ontario, [1999] O.J. No. 1661, 99 O.T.C. 70 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
17
 S.O. 1995, c. 6. 
18
 Vanscoy v. Ontario, [1999] O.J. No. 1661, 99 O.T.C. 70, at para. 22 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
19
 Vanscoy v. Ontario, [1999] O.J. No. 1661, 99 O.T.C. 70 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
20
 See, for example, Alan Young, Justice for All: The Past, Present and Future of Victims’ 
Rights in Canada, August 11, 1997, prepared for CAVEAT, at 7; Kent Roach, “Crime Victims and 
Substantive Criminal Law” in D. Stuart, R.J. Delisle & A. Manson, Towards a Clear and Just 
Criminal Law: A Criminal Reports Forum (Toronto: Carswell, 1999), at 224. 
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with the exception of Manitoba and British Columbia, there is no formal 
complaint process to deal with alleged violations and most bills of rights 
expressly state that no remedy exists for violations.21 
As noted by Professor David Paciocco,22 the purely symbolic nature 
of “victims’ rights” is clearly deliberate on the part of legislatures. Indeed, 
had the legislatures intended anything more substantive, remedial and 
enforcement provisions could have been included as is found in the 
victims’ rights legislation of other jurisdictions. For instance, in the United 
States, the Crime Victims’ Rights Act,23 enacted in October 2004 as part 
of the federal Code of Service, expressly provides that victims may 
apply for a writ of mandamus and may also motion the court to re-open 
a plea or sentence in certain circumstances.24 Further, to ensure compliance, 
the Act requires the Attorney General to promulgate regulations containing 
“disciplinary sanctions, including suspension or termination from 
employment” for Department of Justice employees who “willfully or 
wantonly” fail to comply with federal law as it relates to the treatment 
of crime victims. The victims’ rights legislation of the United Kingdom 
also contains remedial provisions. As of April 2006, the Code of Practice 
for Victims of Crime provides a binding set of policies on all criminal 
justice agencies in England and Wales in respect of how victims of 
crime are to be treated. Although a breach does not give rise to criminal 
or civil liability, violations may be investigated by the parliamentary 
                                                                                                            
21
 Manitoba’s Victims’ Bill of Rights, S.M. 1998, c. 44, creates an administrative complaint 
process which allows the victim to file a complaint with the Director of Victim Services. The Act 
also imposes a duty on the Director to investigate all complaints and to report back to the victim as 
to any steps taken or recommendations made to address the complaint. British Columbia’s Victims 
of Crime Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 478, s. 12, allows for complaints to be made to the Ombudsman 
except in respect of matters falling within prosecutorial discretion. 
22
 D. Paciocco, “Why the Constitutionalization of Victim Rights Should Not Occur” 
[2005] 49 C.L.Q. 393, at fn. 33.  
23
 18 U.S.C. § 3771.  
24
 In Kenna v. United States Dist. Court, 435 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2006), the Court held that 
the sentencing judge erred in not allowing victims to speak at an offender’s sentencing hearing. In 
that case, more than 60 victims of the two offenders’ multi-million dollar fraud scheme filed victim 
impact statements. In addition, several of them spoke at the co-accused’s sentencing hearing held 
three months earlier before the same judge. In refusing to allow the victims to speak a second time, 
the sentencing judge stated there was not “anything else that could possibly be said”. Following the 
passing of sentence, one victim filed a writ of mandamus seeking an order vacating the sentence as 
well as an order allowing the victims to speak at the rehearing. On review, the Court found that the 
sentencing judge erred. However, as the offender was not a party to the application, it ordered the 
matter back to the district court to determine whether the sentencing hearing should be re-opened 
for purposes of allowing the victims to speak. Ultimately the re-opening was denied.  
634 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
ombudsman and may be taken into account by courts in determining a 
question in the proceedings.25 
While most Canadian victims’ bills of rights lack remedial provisions 
and are largely symbolic in nature, this does not strip them of value. 
Indeed, the enactment of victims’ rights legislation has been significant 
in that the bills establish standards for the treatment of victims, which 
includes the provision of information. The very existence of such legislation 
also serves to increase the general awareness of victims in the criminal 
process. In fact, victims’ rights legislation has had a direct impact on the 
policies governing Crown prosecutors in their treatment of victims.26 
Further, the victims’ rights legislation has influenced the development 
of support services such as the Victim/Witness Assistance Program, 
which provides support and information for victims of crime through the 
criminal process.  
Accordingly, victims today are better informed of the process and 
their role in the system than they have been in the past. Information 
enables victims to assert their rights and thereby exercise more control. 
However, due to the purely administrative nature of victims’ rights 
legislation, it is limited in scope. Consequently, legislative reform aimed 
at providing victims and witnesses with increased procedural and 
participatory rights has also been essential in the evolution of victims’ 
rights. As with the victim rights legislation, the Charter’s influence in 
the reform of the procedural and substantive rules governing criminal 
proceedings is readily apparent.  
2. Procedural Rights: Creating a Fairer Process  
A common complaint of victims of crime is the lack of control over 
the criminal process. Upon the reporting of a crime, victims are thrust 
involuntarily into an unknown entity: the criminal justice system. Further, 
in some circumstances, the criminal process poses a risk of secondary 
victimization, particularly in respect of child witnesses and sexual assault 
complainants.  
The Supreme Court recognized the hardships endured by child 
witnesses in its early Charter jurisprudence. In the decision of R. v. 
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 Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (U.K.), c. 28; Victims Code of Practice, 
Order 2006 No. 629. 
26
 See, for example, Ministry of the Attorney General, Crown Policy, Practice Memorandum 
[2005] No. 11, Victims of Crime: Access to Information & Services Communication and Assignment of 
Sensitive Cases (Ontario, March 31, 2006). 
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Levogiannis,27 L’Heureux-Dubé J., on behalf of a unanimous Supreme 
Court, recognized that the criminal justice system was failing children and 
that it was necessary to consider this context when determining whether 
the accused’s Charter rights were violated by section 486(2.1) (now 486.2) 
of the Criminal Code,28 which allowed for children to testify from outside 
of the courtroom or from behind a screen: 
The examination of whether an accused’s rights are infringed 
encompasses multifaceted considerations, such as the rights of witnesses, 
in this case children, the rights of accused and courts’ duties to ascertain 
the truth. . . . one cannot ignore the fact that, in many instances, the court 
process is failing children, especially those who have been victims of 
abuse, who are then subjected to further trauma as participants in the 
justice process.29  
Applying this contextual analysis, the Court upheld the constitutionality 
of section 486(2.1) and found that the Charter required the protection of 
child witnesses from emotional harm during criminal proceedings.  
The fact that the criminal justice system was equally failing sexual 
assault complainants also did not escape notice.30 Consequently, in an effort 
to protect vulnerable witnesses from the risk of secondary victimization, 
in 1988 Parliament completely overhauled the procedural and evidentiary 
rules applicable in respect of sexual offence proceedings and children’s 
testimony through a series of amendments designed to: allow for the use 
of various testimonial aids including screens, closed-circuit television, 
videotaped evidence and support persons; abolish the former statutory 
requirement of corroboration in respect of the unsworn evidence of 
children; and create a statutory presumption against the admission of a 
complainant’s sexual history.31  
                                                                                                            
27
 [1993] S.C.J. No. 70, 85 C.C.C. (3d) 327, at 333-36 (S.C.C.). 
28
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
29 R. v. Levogiannis, [1993] S.C.J. No. 70, 85 C.C.C. (3d) 327, at 333 (S.C.C.). 
30
 See, for example, the Supreme Court of Canada decisions of R. v. Osolin, [1993] S.C.J. 
No. 135, 86 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, 66 C.C.C. 
(3d) 321 (S.C.C.), wherein the Court recognized that in prosecutions of sexual offences, the law 
historically accepted irrelevant evidence as being relevant based upon discriminatory myths about 
women.  
31
 Bill C-15 was enacted on January 1, 1988 (An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the 
Canada Evidence Act, S.C. 1986-87, c. C-15, R.S.C. 1985, c. 19 (3rd Supp.)) and provided for the 
use of screens, testimony outside of the courtroom, the admission of a complainant’s prior videotaped 
statement in certain circumstances and the abolition of the requirement of corroboration in respect 
of the unsworn testimony of child witnesses. Rape-shield legislation was first introduced on April 
26, 1976 as a result of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1975, S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 93, s. 8, but 
underwent a number of amendments. In fact, the 1976 provision was found to provide even less 
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As with section 486(2.1) of the Criminal Code,32 it was only a question 
of time before these other provisions were challenged on the basis that 
they violated the right to a fair trial and the right to full answer and 
defence. Indeed, in R. v. L. (D.O.),33 the Supreme Court considered the 
validity of section 715.1 of the Code, which allows for the admission  
of prior videotaped statements of children in certain circumstances. In 
upholding the validity of this provision, the Supreme Court again adopted 
a contextual analysis and considered the rights of the accused alongside 
the rights of complainants and witnesses. As stated by L’Heureux-Dubé J., 
in a concurring judgment: 
I suggest that the Charter requires that we bring these multiple 
considerations foremost in our mind, as truth cannot be attained in a 
vacuum. Children require special treatment to facilitate the attainment 
of truth in a judicial proceeding in which they are involved. 
. . . . . 
. . . in the determination of what is fair, one must bear in mind the 
rights and capabilities of children . . .34 
As evidenced by these statements, almost immediately following the 
enactment of the Charter, the Supreme Court of Canada used Charter 
principles to recognize that the rights of complainants and witnesses 
must be considered at the initial stage of defining the actual scope of an 
accused’s Charter rights, rather than under section 1 of the Charter.35 
Through the 1988 amendments to the Code the risk of secondary 
victimization at the hands of the adversarial process was highlighted and 
statutory measures were implemented to minimize it. While these 
amendments were aimed at reducing the risk of secondary victimization 
and eradicating discriminatory beliefs and practices that were prevalent 
                                                                                                            
protection to sexual assault complainants than that provided by the common law: R. v. Seaboyer;  
R. v. Gayme, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, 66 C.C.C. (3d) 321, at 349 (S.C.C.).  
32
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
33
 [1993] S.C.J. No. 72, 85 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. F. (C.C.), [1997] S.C.J. 
No. 89, 120 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (S.C.C.). 
34 R. v. L. (D.O.), [1993] S.C.J. No. 72, 85 C.C.C. (3d) 289, at 307, 312 (S.C.C.). 
35
 See also: R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, 139 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.), wherein the 
Court held that the right to full answer and defence had to be determined in light of the privacy and 
equality rights of complainants and witnesses in respect of third party records. As noted by 
Professor Jamie Cameron, this approach is significant as it places the onus on the accused to 
establish a violation of rights rather than the onus being on the government to justify any limits on 
the accused’s rights which arise from the operation of the statutory provision: “Dialogue and 
Hierarchy in Charter Interpretation: A Comment on R. v. Mills” (2000) 38(4) Alta. L.R. 1051, at 1065-66. 
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under the pre-Charter regime, Parliament did not expressly cite Charter 
principles as the underlying objective when enacting the legislation. Rather, 
the first substantive recognition of victims’ rights by Parliament came in 
August 1992, just over 10 years after the enactment of the Charter, with 
Bill C-49.36 Bill C-49 was enacted in response to the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s decision of R. v. Seaboyer.37 In that case, although the Supreme 
Court recognized the need to prohibit cross-examination of sexual assault 
complainants on their prior sexual history, the Court struck down the 
former section 276 on the basis that a blanket prohibition, irrespective of 
the circumstances of the case, was unreasonable.38  
Significantly, the preamble of Bill C-4939 specifically recognizes the 
need to consider and accommodate the Charter rights of complainants as 
well as the accused by providing, in part, as follows:  
. . . Whereas the Parliament of Canada intends to promote and help to 
ensure the full protection of the rights guaranteed under sections 7 and 15 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; 
Whereas the Parliament of Canada wishes to encourage the reporting 
of incidents of sexual violence or abuse, and to provide for the prosecution 
of offences within a framework of laws that are consistent with the 
principles of fundamental justice and that are fair to complainants as 
well as to accused persons . . . 
Since the enactment of Bill C-4940 in 1992, Parliament has continued 
to cite Charter principles, particularly sections 7 and 15, as its underlying 
objective when enacting other amendments to the Criminal Code41 aimed 
at enhancing and protecting victims’ interests. For instance, in creating 
the regime governing the production of third party records, as set out in 
sections 278.1-278.91 of the Criminal Code, Parliament expressly stated 
that its objective behind Bill C-46 was to help “ensure the full protection 
of the rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
for all”. The preamble to Bill C-46 also provides that since Charter rights 
“are guaranteed equally to all”, in cases of a conflict, Charter rights “are 
                                                                                                            
36
 See the preamble to an Act to amend the Criminal Code (sexual assault), S.C. 1992, c. 38, 
s. 2 proclaimed in force August 15, 1992.  
37
 [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, 66 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.). 
38
 The validity of the revised s. 276 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 was 
subsequently upheld in the decision of R. v. Darrach, [2000] S.C.J. No. 46, 148 C.C.C. (3d) 97 
(S.C.C.).  
39
 Act to amend the Criminal Code (sexual assault), S.C. 1992, c. 38, s. 2. 
40
 Act to amend the Criminal Code (sexual assault), S.C. 1992, c. 38, s. 2. 
41
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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to be accommodated and reconciled to the greatest extent possible”.42 
Similar language is also found in the preamble to Bill C-79, which, in part, 
expanded the use and availability of testimonial aids to more vulnerable 
witnesses and also expanded the term “victim” to allow for the increased 
use of victim impact statements.43  
Most recently, as of January 2, 2006,44 the former age restrictions on 
the availability of testimonial aids and publication bans have been lifted 
entirely, thereby extending the use of these supports and procedural 
protections to all witnesses and complainants provided certain criteria 
are met. In addition, the former discretionary nature of these orders in 
respect of young witnesses testifying in proceedings of enumerated 
offences has been replaced with orders that are mandatory in any 
proceedings whenever the witness is under the age of 18 years or has a 
disability that impairs the witness’s ability to communicate the evidence. 
Consequently, the new provisions effectively create a presumption that 
children or disabled persons can testify with testimonial aids upon request 
subject only to a limited right of refusal where the court is of the view 
that this will interfere with the proper administration of justice.  
The expanded availability and use of testimonial aids in criminal 
proceedings is significant as it gives effect to the Charter principles of 
equality and security of the person by creating a process designed to 
ensure that the testimony of all persons is given equal treatment regardless 
of age, disability or other vulnerability that may affect their ability to 
testify.45 Further, as the eradication of discriminatory beliefs and practices 
                                                                                                            
42
 An Act to amend the Criminal Code (production of records in sexual offence proceedings), 
S.C. 1997, c. 30. The enactment of s. 278 is significant in the development of victims’ rights as the 
regime created in ss. 278.1-278.91 reflects the approach adopted by the minority in the decision of 
R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, 103 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.), rather than that of the majority of 
the Supreme Court. For this reason, the legislation was subject to numerous challenges but was 
ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court in the decision of R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, 28 C.R. 
(5th) 207 (S.C.C.).  
43
 Act to amend the Criminal Code (victims of crime) and another Act in consequence, 
S.C. 1999, c. 25. 
44
 Act to amend Criminal Code, the DNA Identification Act and the National Defence Act, 
S.C. 2005, c. 32. 
45
 Similarly, in R. v. Pearson, [1994] B.C.J. No. 2828, 95 C.C.C. (3d) 365 (B.C.C.A.), the 
principled exception to the hearsay rule as set out in R. v. Khan, [1990] S.C.J. No. 81, 59 C.C.C. 
(3d) 92 (S.C.C.), was extended to a disabled adult sexual assault complainant. In that case, the 
Court recognized that in some circumstances, the right to equal protection of the law, as guaranteed 
by s. 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.) 1982, c. 11, required modifications to the traditional 
rules of evidence to ensure that the account of disabled witnesses was received.  
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enhances the ultimate fairness of trial and the search for the truth, these 
developments do not violate the Charter rights of accused persons.  
3. Participatory Rights: Gaining a Voice in Criminal Proceedings  
(a) Sentencing and Other Disposition Proceedings 
The road to acquiring participatory rights in the criminal justice 
system for victims has been long and arduous. Prior to 1988, victims 
were forced to assume the role of silent bystanders who were entirely 
dependent upon the prosecutor to determine what, if any, evidence of 
victim impact to adduce in the sentencing proceedings. In fact, some early 
attempts by victims to adduce direct evidence of the impact that the offence 
had on them were quickly dismissed by courts.46  
Given this history, the introduction of victim impact statements 
arising from the proclamation of Bill C-89 on October 1, 1988,47 was an 
unprecedented breakthrough for victims of crime. For the first time in 
the history of the Canadian criminal justice system, victims were given 
a voice in the criminal process, albeit a limited one which was subject to 
the court’s discretion.48  
It took a further eight years before the concept of victim participation 
in sentencing proceedings became a statutory right of victims, rather 
than one subject to the court’s discretion.49 Since then, the Code has 
undergone further amendments, each one further entrenching the concept 
of victim participation in the criminal process. For instance, in an effort 
to give victims greater participatory rights at the time of sentencing, the 
victim impact provisions of the Code were amended on December 1, 
                                                                                                            
46
 See, for example, R. v. Robinson, [1983] O.J. No. 2416, 38 C.R. (3d) 255 (Ont. H.C.J.), 
wherein the Court held that a statement from the father of a deceased victim was irrelevant to the 
issue of sentence and that its admission would be unfair to the accused. Also, in R. v. Antler, [1982] 
B.C.J. No. 1705, 69 C.C.C. (2d) 480 (B.C.S.C.), a request by the lawyer for a young sexual assault 
victim to make submissions regarding the emotional effect of the offence on the victim was denied. 
A mandamus application by the victim to compel the sentencing judge to receive the submissions 
was equally unsuccessful.  
47
 An Act to amend the Criminal Code (victims of crime), R.S.C. 1985, c. 23 (4th Supp.).  
48
 Section 735(1.1) to (1.4) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 provided that the 
Court “may consider a statement ...”. Now, s. 722(1) provides that “the Court shall consider any 
statement...”. 
49
 Bill C-41, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sentencing), S.C. 1995, c. 22, which was 
proclaimed in force on September 3, 1996, replaced the word “may” with “shall”, thereby mandating 
the admission and consideration of impact statements that are prepared and filed as required.  
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1999.50 The 1999 amendments expanded the term “victim” to allow for 
multiple victim impact statements,51 created a duty of inquiry on sentencing 
courts, and provided victims with the option of reading their impact 
statements in court.52 The duty of inquiry requires sentencing courts to 
inquire as to whether or not the victim has been advised of the opportunity 
to prepare an impact statement and allows the court to adjourn the 
proceedings to allow for the preparation, filing and presentation of a 
victim impact statement.53  
Despite the mandatory language of the new duty of inquiry found in 
the Code, in practice sentencing courts do not invariably make the 
required inquiry. The failure to make the required inquiry has been 
found not to affect the validity of the proceedings.54 Hence, although the 
creation of a duty of inquiry implicitly recognizes that the existence of 
the right to submit a victim impact statement is meaningless absent 
knowledge that this right exists, whether this will ultimately increase the 
use of victim impact statements remains to be seen as it is highly dependent 
upon compliance by justice system participants. What is evident is that 
as a result of the December 1999 amendments, the admission of victim 
impact statements from multiple persons who are affected by the 
commission of the offence is now not uncommon.55 In addition, victims 
are availing themselves of the opportunity to read their impact statements 
at sentencing hearings.  
Significantly, the right to adduce evidence of victim impact does not 
start and end with sentencing proceedings. Rather, this right has been 
extended to other proceedings including faint-hope hearings,56 hearings 
                                                                                                            
50
 Bill C-79, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (Victims of Crime) and another Act in 
consequence, S.C. 1999, c. 25. 
51
 Prior to this amendment courts were inconsistent in their approach as to whether or not 
multiple statements or the statements of indirect victims could be filed. For instance, in R. v. Curtis, 
[1992] N.B.J. No. 34, 69 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (N.B.C.A.), the Court held that the statement of a woman 
who witnessed her estranged husband assault her new companion was inadmissible as she was not 
the “direct” victim. 
52
 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 722.2(2).  
53
 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 722.2(1).  
54
 R. v. Tellier, [2000] A.J. No. 903, 2000 ABCA 219 (Alta. C.A.). This is in contrast to 
some American jurisdictions where the failure to notify the victim of a plea, or of a parole hearing 
or sentencing hearing may provide grounds to have the decision set aside.  
55
 See, for example: R. v. McDonough, [2006] O.J. No. 2199, 209 C.C.C. (3d) 547 (Ont. S.C.J.), 
in which 18 victim impact statements were filed; and R. v. Daley, [2002] N.B.J. No. 433, 255 N.B.R. 
(2d) 105 (N.B.Q.B.), in which 15 victim impact statements were filed. 
56
 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 745.63(1). This right has existed since 
September 3, 1996, when Bill C-41 was proclaimed in force: See An Act to amend the Criminal 
Code (sentencing) and other Acts in consequence thereof, S.C. 1995, c. 22. 
(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) EXPANDING VICTIMS’ RIGHTS 641 
before the National Parole Board57 and hearings before the Review Board 
in respect of offenders who are found not criminally responsible on 
account of mental disorder.58 Of these extensions, the most controversial 
is the right to file and present victim impact statements in Review  
Board disposition hearings since the objectives of such hearings differ 
significantly from those of sentencing hearings. Specifically, while the 
acknowledgment of, and reparation for, harm done to victims are express 
statutory objectives of sentencing,59 the same is not true of disposition 
hearings in which the primary issue is whether the accused poses  
a significant risk of harm to public safety.60 Also interesting is the 
unprecedented duty of notification imposed on the Review Board. Pursuant 
to section 672.5(13.2) of the Code, upon receipt of an assessment report 
which reflects a change in the accused’s mental condition which may 
provide grounds for a discharge, the Review Board must “notify every 
victim of the offence” that they are entitled to file a victim impact 
statement.61 The introduction of a notification duty in respect of disposition 
hearings is interesting as it goes well beyond the duty of inquiry imposed 
on sentencing courts but is silent as to what, if any, remedy exists for a 
failure to comply. Presumably, as with a failure by a sentencing court to 
comply with its duty of inquiry, a failure by the Review Board to comply 
                                                                                                            
57
 Victims have been permitted to read impact statements in hearings before the National 
Parole Board since 2001: see Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20, ss. 23(1)(e) 
and 25(1); National Parole Board Policy Manual, Policy 10.3. The admission of victim impact 
statements in provincial parole hearings varies, as does the ability to present these statements or 
even attend the hearings. In some American states, including Arizona, the failure to notify the 
victim or to hear from the victim of the offence may provide grounds to have a parole decision set 
aside. See, for example, Hance v. Board of Pardons and Parole, 875 P. 2d 824 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).  
58
 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 672.5(14). The admission of victim impact 
statements in disposition hearings was first introduced on December 1, 1999, following the 
proclamation of Bill C-79 (S.C. 1999, c. 25). More recently, on January 2, 2006, as a result of  
the proclamation of Bill C-10 (S.C. 2005, c. 22), the provisions were amended to impose a duty to 
notify victims in certain circumstances and a duty to inquire as to whether or not the victim is aware 
of the right to prepare a statement prior to the making of a disposition.  
59
 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 718.  
60
 Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), [1999] S.C.J. No. 31, 135 C.C.C. 
(3d) 129 (S.C.C.).  
61
 In Re Harris Unreported decision, July 12, 2006, reasons released September 19, 2006 
(O.R.B.), the Ontario Review Board gave an expansive interpretation to this notification duty and 
found that the term “assessment report” includes a hospital report. Hence, the notification duty 
arises whenever a hospital report suggests that there has been a change in the accused’s mental 
health condition which might provide grounds for a discharge.  
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with the duty of notification will not be fatal to the validity of the 
proceedings.62 
While victim participation is now firmly entrenched in sentencing 
and other disposition proceedings as a result of legislative reform, courts 
are vigilant in guarding against a “runaway model for victim participation”. 
Consequently, courts resist any suggestion that the right to prepare and 
submit evidence of victim impact is a general right of standing in the 
proceedings.63 The lack of a general right of standing in sentencing 
proceedings is evident in the ability of courts to limit the number of 
statements filed and exclude statements that are not in the prescribed 
form or that attempt to speak to the actual length of the sentence.64 
Given these controls, in order to guard against victims developing 
unrealistic expectations as to their role in sentencing or other disposition 
proceedings, clear guidelines at the very outset of the process are required 
as to the use and limits of victim impact statements. Absent such guidelines, 
any subsequent limitations that are placed on the admission and use of 
this evidence will surely leave victims feeling cheated by the system.  
(b) Participatory Rights in the Trial Process  
Although the concept of victim participation originated in the 
sentencing phase, through the Charter and statutory reform based on 
Charter principles, it has now extended to parts of the trial stage. While 
criminal proceedings are far from tripartite in nature, victims now have 
statutory rights of standing in respect of defence applications for the 
production of their private records,65 requests for publication bans66 as 
                                                                                                            
62
 In R. v. Tellier, [2000] A.J. No. 903, 2000 ABCA 219 (Alta. C.A.), the Court found that 
the failure of a sentencing court to comply with the duty of inquiry was not fatal. 
63
 In R. v. Gabriel, [1999] O.J. No. 2579, 137 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 12-13 (Ont. S.C.J.), the 
Court held that although victim impact statements made a significant contribution in providing 
victims with a voice in the criminal process, it was also important to remember that the “criminal trial, 
including the sentencing phase, is not a tripartite proceeding” and that “the dangers of a runaway 
model for victim participation in the sentencing process can, in the long run, serve to defeat the 
very objectives of victim input”.  
64
 In R. v. Gabriel, [1999] O.J. No. 2579, 137 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. S.C.J.), the Court 
restricted its consideration of the victim impact statements to those parts which described the harm 
done to, or loss suffered by, the victim. Also, in R. v. Sparks, [2007] N.S.J. No. 50, 251 N.S.R. (2d) 181 
(N.S. Prov. Ct.), the trial judge refused to allow the victims to read their original unedited impact 
statements and stated at para. 13 that the right to present such evidence was not a general right of 
standing in the sentencing proceedings.  
65
 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 278.4(2). 
66
 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 486.4, 486.5. While these provisions enable 
the complainant or witness to request a publication ban, there are no provisions which provide for 
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well as requests for the use of testimonial aids such as a support person,67 
screens and closed-circuit television.68  
Through this extensive legislative reform, Parliament has expressly 
recognized the need to encourage and facilitate participation by all victims 
and witnesses in the criminal justice system. The creation of limited 
participatory rights at various stages of the criminal process is not only 
laudable social policy but is essential in circumstances where the Charter 
rights of victims or other third parties are at stake.69 Indeed, the enactment 
of the Charter expanded the focus of criminal proceedings such that the 
criminal trial is no longer exclusively concerned with determinations of 
guilt or innocence, but may also be used by the accused to challenge the 
conduct of the police, as well as by third parties to assert their Charter 
rights to the extent their rights are affected. 
Although the Charter offered the means by which courts could allow 
direct participation by victims, victim participation has predominantly 
been based upon statutory rights expressly set out in the Criminal Code.70 
Also, while courts recognize the need to consider and balance victims’ 
rights with those of the accused for purposes of resolving conflicts, they 
are reluctant to recognize any general common law rights of participation. 
For instance, in R. v. O’Connor,71 the Supreme Court created a regime 
for the production and disclosure of private records in the hands of third 
parties. While this regime required that notice be given to third parties, 
the Court was silent as to whether or not the third parties were entitled 
                                                                                                            
an automatic right of standing for families of deceased victims. Consequently, families of deceased 
victims who seek restrictions have had to apply for standing, as was the case in the proceedings 
against Paul Bernardo: French Estate v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1998] O.J. No. 752, 122 C.C.C. 
(3d) 449 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 139 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. 
Bernardo, [1995] O.J. No. 246, 38 C.R. (4th) 229 (Ont. Gen. Div.).  
67
 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 486.1. 
68
 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 486.2. In R. v. Levogiannis, [1993] S.C.J. No. 70, 
85 C.C.C. (3d) 327 (S.C.C.), the Court recognized that the failure to make an order allowing for the 
use of a screen where one was required, may violate the witness’s legal rights. Interestingly, the 
Code does not confer a right of standing in respect of applications under s. 276 to admit evidence of 
the complainant’s prior sexual activity.  
69
 In A. (L.L.) v. B. (A.), [1995] S.C.J. No. 102, 103 C.C.C. (3d) 92 at 106 (S.C.C.), in finding 
that complainants had standing in appeals from a ruling on a third party record application, the 
Supreme Court of Canada held that the “audi alteram partem principle, which is a rule of natural 
justice and one of the tenets of our legal system, requires that courts provide an opportunity to be 
heard to those who will be affected by the decisions”.  
70
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
71
 [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, 103 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.). 
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to make legal submissions at the hearing of the application.72 It was only 
through the enactment of sections 278.1-278.91 of the Code in May 
1997,73 that third parties, including the record holder, the subject of the 
records and any other person to whom the records relate, acquired statutory 
rights of standing for purposes of making legal submissions at the hearing.  
In circumstances where there is no statutory right to make submissions, 
requests for standing fall within the court’s discretionary powers and are 
dealt with on a case-by-case basis.74 Such requests have met with mixed 
success. For instance, the decision of Vanscoy v. Ontario75 established 
that victims have no standing to challenge pleas entered into by the Crown. 
Also, while victims now have statutory rights to provide evidence of 
victim impact, attempts to expand this into a right to speak to or challenge 
the actual sentence imposed have failed.76  
By refusing requests for participatory rights in the resolution of charges 
and by limiting the nature and scope of victim participation at the 
sentencing phase to that which is expressly provided for in the Criminal 
Code,77 courts recognize that the basic concept underlying our criminal 
justice system is that crimes are offences against society as a whole. 
Therefore, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and issues of sentencing 
must serve the public interest, not private interests. Consequently, to the 
                                                                                                            
72
 However, in its companion decision of A. (L.L.) v. B. (A.), [1995] S.C.J. No. 102, 103 C.C.C. 
(3d) 92 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court held that third parties, including complainants who are the 
subject of a third party record application, have standing on appeals from such rulings. As stated by 
L’Heureux-Dubé J., in a concurring judgment at para. 28: 
Here, both the complainant and the Crown possess a direct and necessary interest in making 
representations. Both would be directly affected by a decision regarding the production of 
the complainant’s private records. The decision is susceptible of affecting the course of the 
criminal trial. Both, therefore, must be afforded an opportunity to be heard. 
73
 An Act to amend the Criminal code (production of records in sexual offence proceedings), 
S.C. 1997, c. 30. The constitutionality of this regime was upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada 
in R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, 139 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.).  
74
 French Estate v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1998] O.J. No. 752, 122 C.C.C. (3d) 449, 
at paras. 73-77 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 139 (S.C.C.). 
75
 [1999] O.J. No. 1661, 99 O.T.C. 70 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
76
 In R. v. Tkachuk, [2001] A.J. No. 1277, 159 C.C.C. (3d) 434 (Alta. C.A.), the Court held 
that Alberta’s Victims of Crime Act, S.A. 1996, c. V-3.3 did not provide any rights of participation 
in prosecutorial discretionary decision-making, nor did it provide a right to speak to the length of 
the sentence. Also, in United States of America v. Levy, [2004] O.J. No. 1789, 184 C.C.C. (3d) 427 
(Ont. S.C.J.), the Court found that a victim had no standing to challenge the refusal of a sentencing 
judge to make a restitution order. Similarly, in R. v. Coelho, [1995] B.C.J. No. 1220, 27 W.C.B. 
(2d) 397 (B.C.S.C.), the Court dismissed a certiorari application brought by the father of a deceased 
victim which sought to challenge the sentence imposed. In dismissing the application, the Court 
held that neither the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 nor the Charter gave victims a right to 
speak to the severity of the sentence.  
77
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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extent that victim participation is sought in matters falling within 
prosecutorial discretion or for purposes of speaking to the severity of the 
sentence, it will most likely be denied.  
However, in circumstances where victims have sought standing in 
respect of matters that do not impinge on prosecutorial discretion or do 
not concern the actual sentence imposed, courts have been more receptive. 
Indeed, in the criminal proceedings against Paul Bernardo and the related 
proceedings against his accomplice, Karla Teale, the families of two 
murder victims obtained limited rights of standing at both the trial and 
appellate stage. At the trial stage,78 the families were granted intervenor 
status for purposes of making submissions on an application for an order 
excluding the public from the courtroom during the playing of a videotape 
depicting their deceased daughters. In that case, the families argued that 
their rights under sections 7 and 12 of the Charter would be violated if 
the videotapes were played in open court as it would have a serious 
detrimental effect on their emotional and physical well-being. In granting 
standing, Le Sage A.C.J.O. found that the families had a unique and 
different perspective to offer from the Crown, but also noted that 
intervenor status for victims “will be rare”.79 At the appellate stage, in 
separate proceedings relating to an appeal of a section 810.2 recognizance 
which was ordered in respect of Karla Teale upon her release from 
prison, the two families were again granted intervenor status to make 
submissions on one of four grounds of appeal.80 The standing granted to 
the French and Mahaffy families in the proceedings against Paul Bernardo 
and Karla Teale serves as an excellent example of how victims may play 
a direct role in criminal proceedings without compromising the fair trial 
rights of the accused.  
While the very nature of our adversarial system will always impede 
the expansion of participatory rights for victims in the criminal process — 
since the state as the singular antagonist against the accused is inconsistent 
with criminal proceedings becoming tripartite in nature — this does not 
necessarily preclude any further expansion of victim participation.81 
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 R. v. Bernardo, [1995] O.J. No. 246, 38 C.R. (4th) 229, at 236-37 (Ont. Gen. Div.). 
79
 Similarly, in R. v. Glowatski, [1999] B.C.J. No. 1110, 42 W.C.B. (2d) 355 (B.C.S.C.) 
the family of a deceased victim was granted intervenor status to make submissions opposing a request 
by the media for access to autopsy photos filed as exhibits during the trial proceedings. 
80
 Teale v. Noble, [2005] Q.J. No. 15382, [2005] R.J.Q. 2940 (Que. S.C.).  
81
 Interestingly, in Germany, over the past few decades the criminal justice system has 
undergone a transformation such that victims almost have full participatory rights in criminal 
proceedings, including the right to independent legal representation. For a fuller discussion of victims’ 
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Rather, the focus should now be on the ways in which the Charter may 
be used to allow for increased victim participation while maintaining the 
fair trial rights of the accused.  
In determining whether or not to allow direct victim participation in 
criminal proceedings, factors that courts ought to consider include the 
nature of the issue (e.g., whether it is a matter falling within prosecutorial 
discretion),82 the interests at stake, the risk of prejudice to the accused, 
whether the victims can offer a unique perspective that may be useful to 
the court in resolving the matter in dispute and whether the granting of 
intervention will result in any delay in the proceedings. With respect to 
concerns regarding delays in the proceedings, consideration should also 
be given to the extent to which increased participation can realistically 
be accommodated in an already overburdened system that is on the 
brink of collapse.83 Hence, although some participation by victims in the 
criminal process can co-exist with the fair trial rights of an accused, 
given the need to ensure that criminal charges are not in jeopardy of being 
stayed on account of unreasonable delay, it may be that any increased 
participatory rights of victims can be better accommodated at the appellate 
stage. For instance, in the section 810.2 proceedings in respect of Karla 
Teale, the French and Mahaffy families sought direct involvement in the 
proceedings before the trial court but were persuaded to maintain only a 
“watching brief” at that stage. However, on appeal they were granted 
intervenor status in respect of one issue.84  
The extent to which courts are willing to grant standing to interest 
groups at the appellate stage also offers some guidance as to when and 
how the system can best accommodate increased third party participation. 
While public interest groups do not represent the victim of the offence, 
                                                                                                            
rights in the German legal system, see S. Walther, Victims’ Rights in the German Court System (2006) 
19 Fed. Sent. R. 113.  
82
 The exercise of prosecutorial discretion is not even subject to the review of courts except in 
the very limited circumstances where there is some evidence of bad faith. Accordingly, public policy 
demands that matters falling within prosecutorial discretion are left to the unfettered discretion of 
the Crown acting in the public interest and in accordance with its duties as a Minister of Justice. 
Indeed, in P. (K.) v. Desrochers, [2000] O.J. No. 5061, 52 O.R. (3d) 742 (Ont. S.C.J.), vard [2001] 
O.J. No. 4560, 151 O.A.C. 341 (Ont. C.A.), the Court held that the Crown did not owe a fiduciary 
duty to victims when exercising its discretionary decision-making powers.  
83
 Mr. Justice Moldaver has described the criminal justice system as being in a “state of crisis. 
It is spinning out of control. . . .” Hon. M. Moldaver, “Long Criminal Trials: Masters of a System 
They Are Meant to Serve” (2006) 32 C.R. (6th) 316. 
84
 Teale v. Noble, [2005] Q.J. No. 15382, [2005] R.J.Q. 2940 (Que. S.C.). 
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they often share common interests. For instance, in R. v. Latimer,85 
following the accused’s conviction for murdering his severely disabled 
daughter, groups representing disabled persons were granted intervenor 
status on appeal for purposes of advancing the rights of disabled persons. 
Also, in R. v. Ahenakew,86 B’nai Brith was granted intervenor status on 
the issue of the mens rea for the offence of wilful promotion of hatred 
and the meaning of the word “wilfully” in the realm of hate speech and 
its effects on minorities. While standing was granted in these cases at 
the appellate stage, it is unlikely it would have been granted at the trial 
stage given the increased risk of prejudice to the accused, the risk of delay 
and the need to avoid adding to the complexity of the trial proceedings. 
Indeed, in Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. 
Canada,87 the Foundation was granted standing on appeal for purposes 
of advocating on behalf of children and children’s rights. However, the 
Court rejected the claim that children should have the right to independent 
legal representation at the trial stage or that the failure to provide for this 
violated children’s rights to due process under section 7 of the Charter. 
These decisions demonstrate the greater flexibility of the appellate stage 
to allow for the direct participation of third parties.  
4. Welfare Rights of Victims: Restitution and Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Schemes 
In addition to the increased procedural and substantive rights of 
victims, there has also been an increase in the welfare rights of victims 
over the last 25 years. This increase is most evident in the creation and 
growth of support services designed to assist victims of crime through 
the criminal process and in the increased availability of restitution for 
loss suffered as a result of the commission of the offence. Victims now 
have the support of the Victim/Witness Assistance Program, toll -free 
government information lines and an increased number of community-
based services.  
With regards to the issue of compensation, there is no doubt that in 
many circumstances crime victims suffer financial loss as a result of the 
offence. The financial loss may arise from various factors such as the 
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loss of, or damage to, property, the loss of income or support in 
circumstances where the commission of the crime affects the victim’s 
earning capacity, or it may be due to expenses incurred for a funeral,  
counselling or medical treatment. While some form of compensation for 
victims of crime has always been available, whether under the Criminal 
Code88 or some other legislative provision, compensation for victims of 
crime remains woefully inadequate.  
From the inception of the Criminal Code in 1892,89 provision was 
made for some degree of compensation. However, the difficulty with 
these provisions was that it required the victim to bring the application 
and it was also closely tied to the property values underlying the Code 
such that it compensated for loss of or damage to property but made no 
provision for the loss of income or other forms of financial harm. This 
changed with the proclamation of Bill C-41 on September 3, 1996, which 
created a new Part XXIII of the Criminal Code.90 Bill C-41 repealed the 
former compensation provisions of the Code and replaced them with 
new provisions allowing for restitution orders that were not dependent 
upon an application by the aggrieved party and which were available to 
cover pecuniary damages such as loss of income.91 Consequently, the 
availability of restitution was significantly expanded.  
The availability of restitution under the Criminal Code is important 
as the civil process is not readily accessible to all victims of crime for a 
myriad of reasons, including a lack of financial resources as well as the 
time and emotional stamina required to pursue the matter in civil courts. 
Accordingly, the making of a restitution order spares the victim the civil 
process yet achieves the same result since the order may be filed and 
enforced as a judgment of the civil court.92  
Interestingly, one of the more controversial restitution orders made 
in recent years was the order made in favour of Louise Russo, who was 
rendered a paraplegic when hit by a stray bullet during a botched contract 
killing. In that case, a number of accused were charged and pleaded guilty 
to various offences including attempt murder, conspiracy to commit murder 
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and weapon offences.93 As part of the plea agreement, Ms. Russo received 
$2 million in restitution from the convicted offenders to assist with the 
costs of her future care. Although all of the offenders also received fairly 
lengthy and entirely fit jail sentences, the substantial restitution was the 
subject of much controversy. Many questioned whether the offenders 
had bought a “get out of jail early” card. The controversy surrounding 
the making of this restitution order crystallizes how society’s interest in 
punishing offenders is not the mirror image of the victim’s interest and 
can be more punitive.  
The availability of restitution orders under the Criminal Code94 is an 
important tool for victims seeking financial redress, but its availability is 
limited. Indeed, it is dependent upon many variables including, most of all, 
a conviction. It is also dependent upon the discretion of the sentencing 
court,95 the offender’s ability to pay,96 the amount of the loss being readily 
ascertainable97 and the general principles of sentencing. Given these 
variables, it is easy to see why many victims who have suffered financial 
loss do not receive any restitution. Consequently, the availability of other 
avenues of financial redress and particularly victim compensation schemes 
is crucial. However, victims have been ill served by the compensation 
schemes in existence throughout the country.  
Commencing in 1973, the federal government started to fund criminal 
injuries compensation schemes. However, federal funding ceased in 1992 
with the introduction of the victim fine surcharge scheme instituted 
under the Criminal Code.98 Since then, the funding and operation of 
criminal injuries compensation schemes has fallen to provincial and 
territorial governments. The lack of a national scheme gives rise to 
inequality of treatment. Some jurisdictions offer no compensation for 
victims of crime, while others that do offer compensation subject victims 
to a highly cumbersome and bureaucratic process or lack measures 
designed to ensure that victims are made aware of its availability. Hence, 
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it is not surprising that over the years many criticisms have been voiced 
concerning the criminal injuries compensation programs.99  
By far the most damning criticism of any provincial criminal injuries 
compensation scheme came in February 2007, with the release of the 
Ontario Ombudsman’s Report Adding Insult to Injury.100 In his Report, 
the Ombudsman found that rather than supporting and helping victims 
of crime, the Ontario Criminal Injuries Compensation Board greeted 
victims with “bureaucratic indifference and suspicion”. The Report also 
found that the Board “trades in technicality and embraces delay” rather 
than “giving steadfast and urgent assistance”. Throughout his scathing 
Report, the Ombudsman cites several examples of shockingly poor 
treatment by the Board of victims of violent crime. The Ombudsman 
also found that in many instances, rather than offering a helping hand, 
the Board was guilty of inflicting secondary victimization by operating 
in a manner that invites and encourages victims to fail in their attempt to 
obtain compensation. Moreover, in addition to making the application 
process extremely lengthy and unnecessarily complicated, the Board 
attempts to “fly under the radar” such that only one in every 40 victims 
of violent crime even tries to apply for compensation.101 As a result of 
reviewing several files which had been the subject of complaint, the 
Ombudsman concluded as follows: 
The obvious conclusion is that the Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Board functions, even in the unimpressive way it does, by flying under 
the radar so that only a miniscule number of entitled claimants ever come 
forward. It creates hyper-technical hurdles that discourage applicants and 
stockpiles the claims made by those who are uncommonly persistent. 
This is a shocking state of affairs. The Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Board is not an institution to be celebrated. It is an embarrassment.102 
While the Ombudsman’s Report highlighted the many problems 
with the Ontario Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, the Boards of 
other provinces are not without criticism. Rather, all criminal injuries 
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compensation schemes may be criticized for their restrictive eligibility 
criteria and their lack of outreach programs to increase awareness and 
encourage applications. Further, they are all saddled with over-bureaucratized 
processes. What is clear is that the money raised through the imposition 
of victim fine surcharges pursuant to section 737 of the Criminal Code103 
is not reaching the intended beneficiaries: victims. Renewed efforts must 
be made to ensure that the millions of dollars raised each year through 
the imposition of victim fine surcharges is actually used to fund programs 
designed to assist victims of crime at all stages of the criminal process. 
Further, outreach programs are necessary to ensure that victims are aware 
of the availability of compensation and offered assistance in the application 
process.  
In response to the Ombudsman’s Report condemning the Ontario 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, on March 2, 2007, the Attorney 
General announced the appointment of former Chief Justice McMurtry, 
who is “to forge a new framework for victim support and compensation” 
following broad-based consultations with both victims’ organizations and 
communities.104 Hopefully this review will address the problems with the 
current program and develop a new framework for victim support and 
compensation. Such a new framework should focus on the needs and 
interests of victims and be driven by Charter principles, including the 
right to security of the person, privacy and the right to equal protection 
and benefit of the law. 
III. CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that victims of crime have made significant gains 
over the last 25 years. There is also no doubt that the Charter has 
contributed greatly to these gains and will continue to influence the 
development of victims’ rights in the coming years. Indeed, the media, 
another traditional outsider to the criminal process, has used section 2 of the 
Charter to acquire recognized rights of standing in respect of restrictions 
that are placed on the right to access or disseminate information filed or 
heard in court proceedings. Interestingly, the media, through its continuous 
efforts, appear to have made greater gains under section 2 of the Charter 
than victims have obtained through sections 7, 8 and 15 of the Charter. In 
fact, as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision of Dagenais v. Canadian 
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Broadcasting Corp.,105 the media gained a common law right of standing 
in criminal trial proceedings prior to victims. There are several possible 
explanations for this apparent disparity. First, unlike victims, who are not 
mentioned in the Charter, “freedom of the press” is expressly recognized 
in section 2 of the Charter. Further, the media have significantly greater 
resources and are capable of advancing more coordinated and focused 
challenges to restrictions on their ability to access and disseminate 
information to the pubic. Media conglomerates have highly skilled in-
house counsel who are capable of effectively responding in short order 
to any such restrictions. In contrast, crime victims do not constitute one 
collective group with a shared common interest, they do not have counsel 
on retainer and they often do not know or fully understand their rights 
within the system. Also, one of the key obstacles faced by victims is a 
lack of financial resources needed to participate in the process for purposes 
of advancing their own interests. In this regard, it is noteworthy that of 
all the victims’ bills of rights, only Manitoba’s and British Columbia’s 
expressly provide for legal representation for victims in respect of third 
party record applications. In other provinces, legal aid assistance may be 
available for such applications.106 However, there is no available funding 
in respect of the many other issues that may impact on victims’ rights 
and interests.  
Accordingly, while the role of victims in the criminal process has 
evolved significantly over the last 25 years, there are lingering concerns.107 
The Charter offers a mechanism for addressing these concerns. Since the 
Charter is a “living tree”, victims can continue to use the Charter to 
further entrench their role and rights of participation in the criminal 
process. The Charter should also be used to ensure an equitable balance 
between victims’ rights and the rights of the accused in individual cases. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s leading decisions of R. v. O’Connor108 and 
R. v. Mills109 recognize that victims’ rights are deserving of equal 
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protection. No doubt, the concept of equal protection and equal rights 
will continue to influence all cases in which there is a conflict of rights. 
In this regard, the words of La Forest J., in R. v. Lyons offer some 
guidance: “ . . . s. 7 of the Charter entitles the appellant to a fair hearing; 
it does not entitle him to the most favourable procedures that could 
possibly be imagined”.110 Also, as stated by McLachlin J. (as she then was) 
and Iacobucci J. in R. v. Mills: “fundamental justice embraces more than 
the rights of the accused.”111  
Finally, it remains to be seen whether the appointment of an 
Ombudsman for Victims of Crime by the federal government in 2007 
will assist in the further development of victims’ rights. What is clear, 
however, is that victims have moved from the sidelines and are no 
longer silent passive observers in the criminal process. Accordingly, 
efforts must be made to accommodate their interests in a manner that 
also preserves the fundamental right of an accused to a fair trial. The 
Charter has and will continue to serve as a key instrument by which 
these goals can be accomplished, through both statutory reform and 
developments in the common law. 
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